Abstract-There is significant interest to develop proactive ap proaches to cyber defense, in which future attack strategies are anticipated and these insights are incorporated into defense de signs. This paper considers the problem of protecting computer networks against intrusions and other attacks, and leverages the coevolutionary relationship between attackers and defenders to derive two new methods for proactive network defense. The first method is a bipartite graph-based machine learning algorithm which enables information concerning previous attacks to be "transferred" for application against novel attacks, thereby sub stantially increasing the rate with which defense systems can suc cessfully respond to new attacks. The second approach involves exploiting basic threat information (e.g., from cyber security ana lysts) to generate "synthetic" attack data for use in training de fense systems, resulting in networks defenses that are effective against both current and (near) future attacks. The utility of the proposed methods is demonstrated by showing that they outper form standard techniques for the task of detecting malicious net work activity in two publicly-available cyber datasets.
INTRODUCTION
Rapidly advancing technologies and evolving operational prac tices and requirements increasingly drive both private and pub lic sector enterprises toward highly interconnected and techno logically convergent information networks. Proprietary infor mation processing solutions and stove-piped databases are giv ing way to unified, integrated systems, thereby dramatically increasing the potential impact of even a single well-planned network intrusion, data theft, or denial-of-service attack. It is therefore essential that commercial and government organiza tions develop network defenses which are able to respond rap idly to, or even foresee, new attack strategies and tactics.
Recognizing these trends and challenges, some cyber secu rity researchers and practitioners are focusing their efforts on developing proactive methods of cyber defense, in which fu ture attack strategies are anticipated and these insights are in corporated into defense designs [e.g., 1-5]. However, despite this attention, much remains to be done to place the objective of proactive defense on a rigorous and quantitative foundation. Fundamental issues associated with the dynamics and predict ability of the coevolutionary "arms race" between attackers and defenders have yet to be resolved. For instance, although recent work has demonstrated that previous attacker actions and de fender responses provide predictive information about future 978-1-61284-4577-0085-9/11/$26.00 ©2011 IEEE
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Socorro, NM USA kglass@icasa.nmt.edu attacker behavior [3] [4] [5] , not much is known about which meas urables have predictive power or how to exploit these to form useful predictions. Moreover, even if these predictability and prediction issues were resolved, it is still an open question how to incorporate such predictive analytics into the design of prac tically-useful cyber defense systems. This paper considers the problem of protecting enterprise scale computer networks against intrusions and other attacks, and explicitly leverages the coevolutionary relationship be tween attackers and defenders to develop two new methods for proactive network defense. Each method formulates the task as one of behavior classification, in which innocent and malicious network activities are to be distinguished, and each assumes that only very limited prior information is available regarding exemplar attacks or attack attributes. The first method models the data as a bipartite graph of instances of network activities and the features or attributes that characterize these instances. The bipartite graph data model is used to derive a machine learning algorithm which accurately classifies a given instance as either innocent or malicious based upon its behavioral fea tures. The algorithm enables information concerning previous attacks to be "transferred" for use against novel attacks; cru cially, it is assumed that previous attacks are drawn from a dis tribution of attack instances which is related but not identical to that associated with the new malicious behaviors. This transfer learning algorithm provides a simple, effective way to extrapo late attacker behavior into the future, and thus significantly increases the rate with which defense systems can successfully respond to new attacks.
The second approach to proactive network defense pro posed in this paper represents attacker-defender coevolution as a hybrid dynamical system (HDS) [6, 7] , with the HDS discrete system modeling the "modes" of attack (e.g., a particular class of DoS or data exfiltration procedures) and the HDS continu ous system generating particular attack instances corresponding to the attack mode presently "active". Our algorithm takes as input the mode of attack, obtained for example from the in sights of cyber analysts, and generates synthetic attack data for this mode of malicious activity; these data are then combined with actually observed attacks to train a learning-based classi fier to be effective against both current and (near) future at tacks. The utility of the proposed methods is demonstrated by showing that they outperform standard techniques for the task of distinguishing innocent and malicious network behaviors in analyses of two publicly-available cyber datasets.
II.
PRELIMINARIES
We approach the task of protecting computer networks from attack as a classification problem, in which the objective is to distinguish innocent and malicious network activity. Each in stance of network activity is represented as a feature vector x E 91 I F I , where entry Xi of x is the value of feature i for instance x and F is the set of instance features or attributes of interest (x may be normalized in various ways [7] ). Instances can belong to one of two classes: positive / innocent and negative / mali cious; generalizing to more than two classes is straightforward.
We wish to learn a vector cE91 1F1 such that the classifier orient In what follows we present two new learning-based ap proaches to cyber defense which are able to perform well with only very modest levels of prior knowledge regarding the at tack classes of interest. The basic idea is to leverage "auxiliary" information which is readily available in cyber security appli cations. More specifically, the fust proposed method is a trans fer learning algorithm [e.g., 9] which permits the knowledge present in data on previous attacks to be transferred for imple mentation against new attacks. The second approach uses prior knowledge concerning attack "modes" to generate synthetic attack data for use in training defense systems, resulting in networks defenses which are effective against both current and (near) future attacks.
III. METHOD ONE: TRANSFER LEARNING
In this section we fust derive a bipartite graph-based transfer learning algorithm for distinguishing innocent and malicious network behaviors, and then demonstrate the algorithm's ef fectiveness through a case study using publicly-available net work intrusion data obtained from the KDD Cup archive [10] .
The basic hypothesis is simple and natural: because attacker / defender behavior coevolves, previous activity should provide some indication of future behavior, and transfer learning is one way to quantify and operationalizes this intuition.
A. Proposed Algorithm
The development of the proposed algorithm begins by mod eling the problem data as a bipartite graph Gb, in which in stances of network activity are connected to their features (see Figure 1 ). It is easy to see that the adjacency matrix A for graph
Gb is given by (2) where matrix X E 91nx lFl is constructed by stacking the n instance Assume that the initial problem data consists of a collection of n = nT + ns network events, where nT is the (small) number of labeled instances available for the target domain, that is, examples of network activity of current interest, and ns »n T is the number of labeled instances from some related source do main, say reflecting recent activity; suppose also that a modest lexicon FJ of labeled features is known (this set can be empty).
Let this label data be used to encode vectors dTE91 n T , dsE91 n S , and wE91 1F1, respectively. Denote by dTestE91 n T , d S estE91 n S , and C E 91 I F1 the vectors of estimated class l�bels for the target and source instances and the features, and defme the augmented classifier caug = [ds , e/ dT , e/ C T ] T E 91 n+lFl. Note that the quan tity caug is introduced for notational convenience in the subse quent development and is not directly employed for classifica tion.
We derive an algorithm for learning caug, and therefore c, by We wish to learn an augmented classifier caug with the fol lowing four properties: 1.) if a source instance is labeled, then the corresponding entry of ds , est should be close to this ±l label;
2.) if a target instance is labeled, then the corresponding entry of dT , est should be close to this ±1 label, and the information encoded in dT should be emphasized relative to that in the source labels ds,; 3.) if a feature is in the lexicon F], then the corresponding entry of c should be close to this ±l label; and 4.) if there is an edge Xij ofGb which connects an instance i and a feature j, and Xij possesses significant weight, then the esti mated class labels for i and j should be similar.
The four objectives listed above may be realized by solving the following minimization problem:
where L = D -A is the graph Laplacian matrix for Gb, with D the diagonal degree matrix for A (i.e., Dii = Lj Aij), and Pi> P 2 , P3, ks, and kT are nonnegative constants. Minimizing (3) en forces the four properties we seek for cau£, More specifically, the second, third, and fourth terms penalize "errors" in the first three properties, and choosing P 2 > PI and kT > ks favors target label data over source labels. To see that the first term enforces the fourth property, note that this expression is a sum of com ponents of the form Xij (dT , est , i -Cj) 2 and Xij (d S , est , i -c/ o The constants PI, P 2 , P3 can be used to balance the relative impor tance of the four properties. 
where the Lij are matrix blocks of L of appropriate dimension.
The system (4) is sparse because the data matrix X is sparse, and therefore large-scale problems can be solved efficiently.
Note that in situations where the set of available labeled in stances and features is very limited, classifier performance can be improved by replacing L in (4) with the normalized Lapla
2 LD-1I 2 , or with a power of this matrix L n k (for k a positive integer).
We summarize the above discussion by sketching an algo rithm for constructing the proposed transfer learning classifier:
Algorithm TL (Transfer Learning):
1. Assemble the set of equations (4) 
B. Algorithm Evaluation
We now examine the performance of Algorithm TL for the problem of distinguishing innocent and malicious network ac tivity in the KDD Cup 99 dataset, a publicly-available collec tion of network data consisting of both normal activities and attacks of various kinds [10] . For this study we randomly se lected 1000 Normal connections (N), 1000 denial-of-service attacks (DoS), and 1000 unauthorized remote-access events (R2L) to serve as our test data. Additionally, small sets of each of these classes of activity were chosen at random from [10] to be used for training Algorithm TL, and a lexicon of four fea tures, two positive and two negative, was constructed manually and employed to form the lexicon vector W.
We defined two tasks with which to explore the utility of Algorithm TL. In the first, the goal is to distinguish N and DoS instances, and it is assumed that the following data is available to train Algorithm TL: 1.) a set of ds/2 labeled N and ds/2 la beled R2L instances (source data), 2.) a set of dT/2 labeled N and dT/2 labeled DoS instances (target data), and 3.) the four lexicon features. Thus the source domain consists of N and R2L activities and the target domain is composed of N and DoS instances. In the second task the situation is reversed -the objective is to distinguish N and R2L activities, the source do main is made up of ds (total) labeled N and DoS instances, and the target domain consists of dT (total) Nand R2L instances. In all tests the number of labeled source instances is d s = 50, while the number of target instances dT is varied to explore the way classifier performance depends on this key parameter. Of particular interest is determining if it is possible to obtain good performance with only limited target data, as this outcome would suggest both that useful information concerning a given attack class is present in other attacks and that Algorithm TL is able to extract this information.
This study compared the classification accuracy of Algo rithm TL with that of a well-tuned version of the RLS algo rithm (1) and a standard naIve Bayes (NB) algorithm [11] ; as the performance of the RLS and NB methods were quite simi lar, we report only the RLS results. Algorithm TL is imple mented with the following parameter values: 131 = l.0, 132 = 3.0, 133 = 5.0, k s = 0.5, kT = l.0, and k = 5. We examined training sets which incorporated the following numbers of target in stances: nT = 2, 5, 10,20,30,40,50,60. As in previous studies (see, for example, [10]), only the 34 "continuous features" were used for learning the classifiers.
Sample results from this study are depicted in Figure 2 . Each data point in the plots represents the average of 100 trials. It can be seen that Algorithm TL outperforms the RLS classi fier (and also the standard NB algorithm), and that the differ ence in accuracy of the methods increases substantially as the volume of training data from the target domain becomes small. The performance of Algorithm TL for this task is also superior to that reported for other learning methods tested on these data [e.g., 12]. The ability of Algorithm TL to accurately identify a novel attack after seeing only a very few examples of it, which is a direct consequence of its ability to transfer useful knowl edge from related data, is expected to be of considerable value for a range of cyber security applications. varies with number of available labeled target instances (hori zontal axis) for four tasks: distinguish N and DoS using RLS classifier (blue), distinguish N and DoS using Algorithm TL (red), distinguish Nand R2L using RLS classifier (black), and distinguish Nand R2L using Algorithm TL (magenta), Finally, it is interesting to observe that the bipartite graph formulation of Algorithm TL permits useful information to be extracted from network data even if no labeled instances are available. More specifically, we repeated the above study for the case in which dT = d s = 0, that is, when no labeled instances are available in either the target or source domains. The knowl edge reflected in the lexicon vector w is still made available to Algorithm TL. As shown in Figure 3 , employing a "lexicon only" classifier, as described in Section II, yields classification accuracy which is not much better than the 50% baseline achievable with random guessing. However, using this lexicon information together with Algorithm TL enables useful classi fication accuracy to be obtained (see Figure 3) . This somewhat surprising result can be explained as follows: the "clustering"
property of Algorithm TL encoded in objective function (3) allows the domain knowledge in the lexicon to leverage latent information present in the unlabeled target and source in stances, thereby boosting classifier accuracy. 
IV. METHOD Two: SYNTHETIC ATTACK GENERATION
In this section we derive our second algorithm for distinguish ing normal and malicious network activity and demonstrate its effectiveness through a case study using the publicly-available Ling-Spam dataset [13] . Again the intuition is that attacker / defender coevolution should make previous activity somewhat indicative of future behavior, and in the present case we ex ploit this notion by generating "predicted" attack data and us ing this synthetic data for classifier training.
A. Proposed Algorithm
The development of the second approach to proactive de fense begins by modeling attacker / defender interaction as a stochastic hybrid dynamical system (S-HDS). Here we present a brief, intuitive overview of the basic idea; a comprehensive description of the modeling procedure is detailed in [7] . An S HDS (see Figure 4) is a feedback interconnection of a discrete state stochastic process, such as a Markov chain, with a family of continuous-state stochastic dynamical systems [6, 14] . Com bining discrete and continuous dynamics within a unified, computationally tractable framework offers an expressive, scalable modeling environment that is amenable to formal mathematical analysis. In particular, S-HDS models can be used to efficiently represent dynamical phenomena which evolve on a broad range of time scales, a property of consider able value in the present application [14] .
outputs mode inputs Figure 4 . Schematic of basic S-HDS feedback structure. The discrete and continuous systems in this framework model the selection of attack "mode" and resulting adver sary behavior, respectively, which arise from the coevol ving attacker-defender dynamics.
As a simple illustration of the way the S-HDS formalism We show in [7] that a range of adversarial behavior can be rep resented within the S-HDS framework, and derive simple but reasonable models for Spam-Spam filter dynamics and for ba sic classes of network intrusion attacks.
In [14] we develop a mathematically-rigorous procedure for predictive analysis for general classes of S-HDS. Among other capabilities, this analytic methodology enables the predictabil ity of a given dynamics to be assessed and the predictive meas urables (if any) to be identified. Applying this predictability assessment process to the adversarial S-HDS models con structed in [7] reveals that, for many such systems, the most predictive measurable is the mode of attack, that is, the state variable for the discrete system component of the S-HDS (see [7] for a detailed description of this analysis). Observe that this result is intuitively sensible.
This analytic fmding suggests the following synthetic data learning (SDL) approach to proactive defense. First, identify the mode(s) of attack of interest. For attacks which are already underway, [7] offers an S-HDS discrete-system state estimation method that allows the mode to inferred using only modest amounts of measured data. Alternatively, and of more interest in the present application, it is often possible to identify likely future attack modes through analysis of auxiliary information sources (e.g., the subject matter knowledge possessed by do main experts or "non-cyber" data such as that found in social media [16, 17] ).
Once a candidate attack mode has been identified, synthetic attack data corresponding to the mode can be generated by em ploying one of the S-HDS models derived in [7] . The synthetic data take the form of a set ofK network attack instance vectors, denoted A s = {XSh ... , XSK}' The set As can then be combined with (actual) measurements of L normal network activity in stances, NM = {XNMh ... , XNML}, and P (recently) observed at tacks, AM = {XM" ... , XMP}, yielding the training dataset TR = N M U AM U A s of real and synthetic data. It is hypothesized that training classifiers with the augmented set TR may offer a mechanism for deriving defenses which are effective against both current and near future malicious activity.
We summarize the above discussion by sketching a proce dure for constructing the new SDL classifier:
Algorithm SDL:
1. Identify the mode( s) of attack of interest (e.g., via domain experts or auxiliary data).
2.
Generate a set of synthetic attack instances As correspond ing to the attack mode identified in Step 1.
3.
Assemble sets of normal network activity N and measured attack activity AM for the network under study.
4.
Train a classifier (e.g., RLS, NB) using the training data TR = NM u AM U As. Estimate the class label (innocent or malicious) of any network activity x with the formula: ori ent(x) = sign(c T x).
B. Algorithm Evaluation
We now examine the performance of Algorithm SDL for In generating the A W attacks in Scenarios 2. and 3., we assume that the attacker knows to construct A W Spam to defeat an NB filter but does not have knowledge of the specific filter in volved [15] . Analogously, the synthetic A W attacks generated Sample results from this study are displayed in Figure 5 . 
